Drawing on the extensive economics literature on wage rigidity, we examine bonus rigidity and, in particular, the implications of downward bonus rigidity for future performance. We find distributional support for downward rigidity in bonus payments. More importantly, we find that bonus cuts have distinct negative implications for future firm performance. Indeed, our evidence indicates that bonus rigidity is the primary driver of the positive relation between unexpected cash compensation and future performance documented by Hayes and Schaefer (2000). Our evidence is also broadly consistent with morale theories of pay rigidity (Bewley, 1995(Bewley, , 2002 Yellen, 1984) which posit that employers avoid reducing nominal wages due to the adverse impact such cuts have on employee morale. This relation in turn suggests that morale consequences are an important factor in management compensation committee decisions to shield pay from adverse performance outcomes such as losses (Dechow et al., 1994; Gaver and Gaver, 1998).
INTRODUCTION
We examine the role of pay rigidity in the context of executive bonus pay determination.
In the economics literature, wage rigidity has long been a focus of both theoretical and empirical interest. Downward wage rigidity is thought to be a key driver of aggregate unemployment effects. That is, in recessionary time periods, downward rigidity inhibits firms from lowering wages to equilibrium levels leading to involuntary unemployment (Yellen, 1984) . In this study we consider executive pay implications of rigidity, specifically focusing on the negative relation between cash compensation and future performance documented by Hayes and Schaefer (2000) .
Our analysis draws upon the rich theoretical economics literature on pay rigidity to frame its empirical analysis. Conceptually, downward rigidity may stem from anticipated adverse morale consequences (e.g., Akerlof, 1982; Bewley, 1995 Bewley, , 2002 . That is, compensation cuts demoralize employees.
1 However, even absent morale effects, wage rigidity can arise in equilibrium due to turnover being implicitly or explicitly costly (e.g., Harris and Holmstrom, 1982; Stiglitz, 1974; Weiss, 1980) or, most simply from conditions that make periodic rather than continuous recontracting desirable (e.g., Baily, 1974; Fischer, 1977; Stiglitz, 1986) , commonly termed contract theories of rigidity. Our analysis examines and empirically evaluates the differing future performance implications of these various rigidity perspectives.
A crucial aspect of our analysis stems from the fact that downward pay rigidity in and of itself does not imply that reductions in executive compensation have unique implications for future performance apart from the general negative implication of the reduction's magnitude 1 While the identification of such behavioral consequences as "morale" is commonly attributed to Bewley (1995 Bewley ( , 2002 , the underlying concept is consistent with earlier work in efficiency wage theory such as Solow (1979) , Akerlof (1982) , and Stiglitz (1986) . (See table 1 of Campbell and Kamlani, 1997, for a comprehensive presentation of various wage rigidity theories in existence prior to the advent of Bewley's morale theory.)
documented by Hayes and Schaefer (2000) . 2 We demonstrate that rigidity's future performance implications depend on the source of the rigidity. In particular, if contracting is the source of the rigidity, then pay decreases or increases do not have unique future performance implications. In contrast, both morale effects and turnover concerns do have such implications. Moreover, such implications are directional and causal. In morale theories, pay cuts reduce morale which, in turn, reduces performance. In turnover theories pay cuts raise the likelihood of employee departures and hence raise employee turnover/replacement associated costs which in turn depress performance.
We confirm the existence of downward rigidity in the distribution of bonus changes and find strong negative associations between bonus reductions and subsequent performance measured as change in ROA/ROE. In fact, when we replicate the Hayes and Schaeffer analysis, bonus decrease is a significant predictor of future performance while cash compensation changes lack significance at conventional levels. That is, the Hayes and Schaeffer finding seems largely attributable to downward rigidity in bonus determinations. Moreover, since these predictive impacts hold after controlling for contemporaneous changes in cash, bonus, and equity compensation it follows that this negative relation is a unique consequence of the decision to cut bonus pay. And, consistent with morale theories of downward pay rigidity, this negative relation holds when we focus on just those instances where there is no change in CEO, and hence no CEO turnover cost. That is, reducing bonus pay adversely impacts morale which, in turn, negatively impacts firm performance.
2 Hayes and Schaefer (2000) document a positive relation between unexpected pay change and future performance. Consequently, unexpected pay reductions have negative performance consequences in proportion to their magnitudes (the magnitude effect). Unique downward rigidity implications arise only if the choice to lower pay has performance consequences above and beyond those associated with the magnitude effect of the pay reduction. .
Our analysis is also relevant to two distinct aspects of the existing literature on executive compensation. First, it addresses the role of compensation choices as a predictor of future firm performance. This connection is most directly seen in our reliance on the Hayes and Schaefer (2000) framework that connects unexpected cash compensation to future performance. Our analysis, however, proposes an observable bonus pay choice, rather than unobservable or noncontractable performance measures (Ederhof, 2010) , as a distinct source of the relation between cash compensation and future performance. The analysis also complements that provided in Hanlon et al. (2003) who study the relation between current compensation and future performance. Their analysis, however, focuses exclusively on the motivational impact of option grants (part of equity incentive pay), finding a positive association between such grants and future operating income. In contrast, our analysis suggests that reductions in bonus compensation have a demoralizing effect on managers, causing declines in future performance.
3 Second, at a fundamental level downward pay rigidity arises when pay is not reduced even though circumstances warrant it. In this sense it is similar in nature to shielding pay from adverse circumstances, a topic that beginning with Dechow et al. (1994) and Gaver and Gaver (1998) has received a great deal of attention in the executive compensation literature.
Explanations for shielding, however, commonly focus on decision-consequences (e.g., not
punishing managers for engaging in restructurings) or on manager influence over compensation committee decisions. Our analysis suggests that non-pecuniary motivational consequences (i.e., "morale") may also play a significant role in compensation committee pay choices regarding shielding. That is, when adverse circumstances dictate a reduction in bonus adverse morale consequences influence the decision to shield compensation from such circumstances.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review on related papers and also develops our hypotheses. We conduct all our empirical analyses in Section 3 and Section 4 concludes.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT

Pay Rigidity Literature
The economics literature on pay rigidity is extensive and focuses in particular on downward rigidity as it is crucial to the existence of involuntary unemployment at the macro level. There is, in particular, an abundance of conceptual work on downward pay rigidity. In this regard, Blinder and Choi (1990) observe that "economists have more theories (regarding downward wage rigidity) than they know what to do with." (see also Okun, 1981, p .9) . Broadly, the subsets of these theories that seem most relevant to executive bonus compensation are: (1) contracting theories; (2) adverse selection and turnover efficiency theories; and, (3) morale theories.
In contracting theories, including implicit contract theory, wage rigidity arises as desirable aspect of long-term contracting. In its simplest form, these theories make the fairly obvious point that, when a long-run contract is in place, there are often inherent advantages to allowing the pay schedules to be renegotiated only on an occasional basis (Fischer, 1977; Taylor, 1979) . In other words, contract theory suggests that a firms do not make immediate compensation adjustments when (either up or down) when performance or economic conditions change due to contracting cost. In more refined models, intertemporal risk aversion on the part of workers makes it particularly advantageous for the firm to provide a steady wage that does not rise or fall with fluctuation in short-run economic conditions (Gordon, 1974; Stiglitz, 1986) .
Dominant downward rigidity arises in contract cost models under the further assumption that nominal pay is, in general, rising (e.g., due to inflation). Mechanically, rising wages make cuts rare and pay increases common.
Adverse selection and turnover efficiency theories focus on costs related to employee turnover as making pay cuts undesirable from the employer perspective. Adverse selection costs in this setting take the form of the most productive workers being the most likely to quit if their wage is reduced (Weiss, 1980 (Weiss, , 1991 and similarly that new worker quality varies inversely with pay. Information asymmetry regarding worker skill/ability is an important aspect of these models. Indeed, Harris and Holmstrom (1982) present a model where in equilibrium firms do not cut pay even when they learn of poor performance or ability. Market forces, in terms of the worker's ability to secure work at a higher wage elsewhere, work in concert with employer uncertainty about true employee skill level, leading the firm to increase, but not decrease pay.
Turnover models are more straightforward, postulating simply that lowering pay increase turnover likelihoods, which is undesirable when turnover is costly due to hiring, training, loss of human capital etc. (Stiglitz, 1974) "Morale" theories focus on adverse behavioral consequences from pay reductions.
4 Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) , for instance, focus on the disutility from job loss which they argue is positively related to pay. Consequently, reducing pay causes workers to more likely take actions that place their job at risk (i.e., "shirking). Other models are more sociological such as Akerlof (1982, 1984) , where wage increases have a gift affect that leads workers to work harder or failing to pay a "fair wage" adversely impacts effort (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990) . More recently, in a series of studies, Bewley (1995 Bewley ( , 2002 simply postulates that wage reduction adversely impacts morale, which in turn adversely affects both individual and collective performance.
Despite the abundance of conceptual work, empirical evidence consistent with general downward rigidity in wages is only weakly supported by examinations of relations between aggregate wages and aggregate macroeconomic indicators (Hall et al., 1975; Solon et al., 1994) .
And, in one of the initial examinations of individual level pay data, McLaughlin (1994) questions the existence of rigidity in real wages. He concludes that "reported wages in panel data reveal remarkable downward flexibility annually; even nominal wage cuts are not rare" (p. 408). Kahn (1997) , however, examines the same data and concludes that there is substantial stickiness in nominal wage changes, with evidence of downward rigidity in wages, but not in salaries. He attributes this stickiness as possibly due to "menu costs", which are the costs involved in assessing performance and implementing small pay adjustments when performance changes.
Menu costs, which are a straightforward extension of contract theory, lead firms to optimally shun making small adjustments in pay. Consequently, at the distributional level, there are an inordinate number of zero pay change observations.
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A particularly relevant analysis for this study is Altonji and Devereux (2000) , who also examine panel data on wages. They find that many of the reported pay reductions in these data correspond to changes in part time/full time status or to changes to performance oriented compensation systems. They conclude that the data suggests a "general model" of downward rigidity where pay reductions are avoided and, when they are implemented, are of smaller 5 Altonji and Devereux (2000) also examine panel data on wages and find that many of the reported pay pay reductions correspond to changes in part time/full time status or to changes to performance oriented compensation systems. They conclude that the data suggests a general model of downward rigidity where pay reductions are avoided and, when they are implemented, are of smaller magnitudes than warranted by the circumstances. (Hence, there is no just below zero discontinuity in the distribution of observed wage changes.
magnitudes than warranted by the circumstances. Hence, while downward rigidity is present, there is no just below zero discontinuity in the distribution of observed wage changes.
On a somewhat different empirical dimension, employer and employee surveys find considerable evidence that both employees and employers take a negative view of pay reductions. Blinder and Choi (1990) conduct in-person surveys of wage-setters (compensation and personnel directors from 19 firms) and find some support for costly turnover as a driver.
However, their evidence, as well as survey evidence reported by Campbell and Kamlani (1997) , also points to "fairness" as a key factor in explaining wage rigidity. They also find that most of their survey participants agreed with the proposition that lower wages would cause employees to work less hard. Based on far more extensive employer survey, Bewley (2002) documents widespread reluctance to reducing wages, with the primary reason being their negative impact on worker morale. Kawaguchi and Ohtake (2004) interview both employers and employees separately in 123 Japanese companies and find that both workers' satisfaction and morale are negatively affected after pay cuts (salary and bonus).
Cash Compensation and Future Performance
CEO compensation has two major components: cash and equity. Cash compensation can be further divided into salary and bonus. Equity compensation ties compensation to future firm performance as it aligns the interests of shareholders and the manager. Consistent with this future incentive implication, Hanlon et al. (2003) find that $1 of option value is associated with $3.17 of future operating income. So it is expected that there should be a positive relation between current equity compensation and future performance. In contrast, cash compensation, and particularly its bonus component, is explicitly linked to contemporaneous performance. To the extent that it reflects a cash payout for achieving certain current performance targets, it should not be incrementally predictive of future performance. However, Hayes and Schaefer (2000) propose a rationale for why a link should exist between cash compensation and future 
where CC t is cash compensation paid in period t.
If Y has persistent implications for an observable performance measure such as X, then it follows that 
Bonus Compensation and Rigidity in Cash Compensation
The annual bonus contract typically is written on accounting performance (Murphy, 1999) , and early empirical compensation studies provide strong evidence that the two are positively correlated (see Lambert and Larcker, 1987) . Indeed, Lambert and Larcker (1987) and Sloan (1993) document that the correlation between cash compensation and earnings is stronger than that between cash compensation and stock return. Given the close tie between a CEO's cash compensation and her accounting performance, early researchers have also explored how a given bonus contract would induce managers to select income-increasing accounting procedure or impede their selection of income-decreasing accounting procedure in order to maximize their compensation (e.g., Gaver et al., 1995; Healy, 1985; Holthausen et al., 1995) .
Further analyses examine the compensation impacts of specific components of earnings. Dechow et al. (1994) show that compensation committees exclude restructuring charges from the earnings definition used for CEOs' cash compensation. They conclude that this shielding encourages the CEO to undertake value enhancing restructuring charges. However, when separating firm-year observations into positive income ones from negative income ones, Gaver
and Gaver (1998) find that while CEO cash compensation is positively related to positive earnings, there is no evidence of a relation when earnings turn negative. In addition, they also find that the gains flow into compensation while losses do not. Using more recent data from ExecuComp, Shaw and Zhang (2010) further document that when the performance is poor, the correlation between cash compensation and performance disappears. Hence, there is considerable evidence that boards shield cash compensation from events that would cause it to decrease (e.g., negative earnings and poor performance).
2.4.
Research Hypotheses
Our analysis addresses rigidity in executive bonus payments in terms of the implications of such rigidity for future performance. We focus on bonus compensation because, unlike salary, bonus reductions are not unusual and we have a particular interest in such reductions as a means for evaluating differential implications of downward versus upward changes in pay. Moreover, bonuses remain unchanged in many cases, which is consistent with there being some degree of rigidity in them. And, such zero change observations are important for benchmarking the separate impacts from bonus increases and bonus decreases. It is also the case that the bonus evaluation process is typically mandated within the corporate governance structure and the payment is a one-time event that pertains to immediate performance. 8 Consequently, "menu costs" should play less of a role. Finally, the bonus determination is strictly tied to the executive's noisily measured periodic performance.
Interestingly, introducing bonus rigidity into the Hayes and Schaeffer framework has no immediate implications for relations between cash compensation and future performance. Bonus rigidity simply converts subsets of what would have been positive and negative changes to zero changes. In other words, bonus rigidity simply reduces the number of non-zero change observations and increases the number of zero change observations meaning that within the subset of non-zero changes, bonus rigidity is indistinguishable in effect from a random-based reduction in sample size. Moreover, this non-impact consequence holds even if the rigidity is directional (e.g., downward rigid). 9 Alternatively, if the decision to change the bonus itself has performance consequences, as is the case for turnover and morale theories of wage rigidity, then pay decreases have explicit negative performance implications. They adversely affect turnover or morale which in turn adversely affects performance. This reasoning is the basis of our first hypothesis:
H1: Relative to bonus increases, bonus reductions are negative performance predictors after
controlling for other contemporaneous and future performance predictors including cash compensation. 8 In contrast, salary changes may be more tied to assessments of cumulative performance and, as salary is rarely reduced, are likely tied to future expectations as well as current performance. 9 The reasoning here is much the same as that underlying stratified sampling designs. Simply changing the likelihood that an observation is sampled does not alter the overall relationship in the data.
While downward rigidity does not have unconditional implications for relations between non-zero pay changes and performance, it does have such implications for understanding zero pay changes and performance. Specifically, assuming that the existing bonus is some positive amount, under downward rigidity no change in the bonus payment implies that performance is either unchanged or poorer (but not poor enough to merit a decrease in pay). Consequently, on average, such zero changes signal negative performance. An important exception to this negative performance implication, one that we exploit in our next hypothesis, arises when no bonus is paid in the prior period. If the prior bonus payment is zero then maintaining the bonus at zero cannot possibly be due to downward rigidity. Hence, if downward rigidity is present, these firms should have better performance than their bonus-paying counterparts. 10 Thus we also test for unconditional downward rigidity effects by examining the following hypothesis:
H2: Among firms with no change in the bonus payment, those firms paying no bonus at all will have better future performance than those firms paying a bonus, after controlling for other contemporaneous and future performance predictors including cash compensation.
Our final hypothesis concerns the implications of general downward rigidity (Altonji and Devereux, 2000) for the magnitude of the relation between cash compensation and negative bonus changes. General downward rigidity is postulated as an explanation for why there is weak distributional support for downward pay rigidity. Specifically, if pay is downwardly, but not upwardly, rigid, then the frequency of small pay increases should be considerably higher than the frequency of small pay decreases. Empirically, however, there is little compelling evidence of 10 In our sample the likelihood that a zero bonus firm pays a bonus in the next period is around 33%. Hence, for these firms there is also an implicit negative signal when no bonus is paid. Any performance implications from this negative signal, however, work against finding a more negative relation for those zero-change firms that are paying a bonus, which is the hypothesis of interest.
this being true. General downward rigidity, however, argues that when pay decreases do occur, they are smaller in magnitude than merited by circumstances. Essentially, they are discounted.
So, for instance, when circumstances dictate a pay cut of $X, pay is only cut by $X*d, where 0<d<1. Such discounting brings in the distribution of pay reductions, filling in for those observations lost to pure downward rigidity (i.e., no cut in pay at all).
If general downward rigidity exists with respect to executive bonuses, then it should impact the magnitude of the relation between bonus and performance differently depending on whether the bonus is being increased or decreased. Suppose, for instance, that absent rigidity the general relation between change in bonus compensation (CB) and performance (P) is:
which can be decomposed as
where the + superscript denotes a bonus increase while the -superscript denotes a bonus reduction. Under general downward rigidity, however, CB -is not observed. Instead, the observed -d) , it follows that (4) can be restated as:
Our general downward rigidity (per Altonji and Devereux) hypothesis follows directly from (5):
H3: The magnitude of the relation between bonus changes and future performance is smaller for bonus reductions than for bonus increases, after controlling for other contemporaneous and
future performance predictors.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Data Sample and Statistics
The main source of data we use for the empirical analyses is ExecuComp in Compustat covering [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . We then merge these data with Compustat for accounting information and CRSP for stock return information. We further require that the same CEO be in office for years t- 
Distributional Evidence of Bonus Rigidity
Conventionally, from a non-survey perspective pay rigidity is addressed at the individual level by examining pay change distributions. Inordinate numbers of zero changes within such distributions are taken as evidence of rigidity. Examinations of downward rigidity focus on the relative frequencies of pay increases and decreases with particular attention given to the relative frequencies of small and large changes. As executive bonuses are a component of pay that are commonly formula based, where the formula contains continuous measures (Ederhof, 2010) , it is an open question as to whether they exhibit rigidity. Consequently, the distribution of bonus changes is of direct interest to our analysis. (inclusive) and $25,000 (exclusive) with 2,754 being zero changes. Such concentration at zero is highly consistent with rigidity. However, 2,320 of these are instances where no bonus is paid in both year t-1 and year t. For this subset it is: (1) impossible for a downward change to happen (i.e., they are by construction downward rigid); and, (2) likely that at least some reflect firms that, a matter of policy, do not pay bonuses to executives. 13 Exclusion of these instances lowers the percentage of observations in the 0 to $25,000 band to 12.8%, a number which is still large comparing with any of the other bands. For example, the two adjacent ranges contain only 5.6%
(-$25,000 to 0) and 7.3% ($25,000 to $50,000) of the observations. That is, there are still pronounced drop offs between the 0 to $25,000 band and the two adjacent bands (a decline of 610 for the -$25,000 to 0 range and a decline of 452 for the 0 to $25,000 range.) And, there remains a distinct concentration of changes at zero. These steep drop-offs are particularly notable given the very small drop offs that are consistently observed between all of the other adjacent bands in the figure. The largest of these is a 205 observation decline between the $50,000 to $75,000 and the $75,000 to $100,000 ranges (which is then partially reversed in next larger range).
There is also some support for downward rigidity in general based on the distribution in figure 1. First, excluding the band between zero and $25,000, there is an obvious asymmetry between the band counts to the right and left of $25,000. The number of observations in both the $25,000 to $50,000 and the $50,000 to $75,000 band exceed those in the -$25,000 to 0 band even though the latter is closer to the sample median change (+$10,000). If the theoretically expected distribution changes, absent downward rigidity, are taken to be approximately symmetric (particularly in its non-extreme range) then frequency should get smaller as distance from the median increases. That is, the counts in the $25,000 to $50,000 and $50,000 to $75,000 bands should be smaller rather than larger than the count in the closer to the median $-25,000 to 0 band.
In order to focus on the presence of downward rigidity in the distribution of bonus changes, we remove all of the zero change and zero bonus (both ZZ and BB groups) from the distribution of changes. 14 The median value of the remaining changes (for all remaining observations in the entire sample) is +$15,570. This non-finding suggests that there is little upward rigidity in bonus pay since upward rigidity should move more observations out of M1 than it does out of P1. However, when we move to the first below zero band, M2, a very different picture emerges. Only 46.9% of the 751 observations in M2 and P2 are in M2. This percentage is significantly smaller than 50% (p-value of .0466).
And, for M3, the percentage drops to 43.8%, again significantly smaller than 50% (p-value of .0006). These results are consistent with observations being moved out of M2 and M3 and via rigidity. That is, they are converted into zero changes and their absence leads to the appearance of asymmetry in the initial below zero bands.
Replication and Extension of Hayes and Schaeffer (2000)
The starting point for our analysis of bonus-related future performance implications is Hayes and Schaefer (2000) . They examine the relation between future performance measured as change in return on equity (∆ROE) in t+1 relative to compensation paid for year t. 
Tests of Hypotheses
Given that we explore the relationship between current bonus rigidity and future performance, we build our model based on Hayes and Schaeffer's to evaluate our three bonus rigidity hypotheses. First, in addition to the two bonus rigidity variables, BC and BI, we also include rigidity variables for salaries, salary cut (SC) and salary increase (SI), and equity compensation, equity compensation increase (EI) and equity compensation decrease (EC). They argue that such extreme cuts provide an incentive for the CEO to work harder.
Alternatively, the positive effect may be an artifact of non-linearity in the tail of the salary change distribution.
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The model (2) estimation introduces bonus paying firms where there is no change in bonus (BB = 1) as a distinct group of interest. The estimated coefficients are negative which is consistent with the expectation that under downward rigidity zero bonus changes have implicit negative performance implications. However, the effect is only significant (.10 level) for ∆ROE.
Finally, the model (3) estimation evaluates whether there is any evidence of general downward rigidity (i.e., performance mandated bonus cuts are discounted). The estimated coefficients in both cases, however, are negative rather than positive. They also lack statistical significance at conventional levels.
Overall, the 
Bounded Bonus Effects
Distinct from most compensation rigidity settings, bonus pay has a highly relevant lower bound of 0. Moreover, this lower bound has substantive empirical implications, as illustrated by our second hypothesis, where zero bonus changes are argued to differ depending on whether or not the original bonus amount is zero. Besides such zero change zero-bonus firms, there are two other sets of observations that may be impacted by this lower bound. First, in our sample there are 2,231 instances in which the bonus is cut to zero (BZ observations). The lower bound issue here is that the observed bonus change is truncated at 0. That is, in such cases, performance was likely considerably worse than what is reflected in the bonus reduction number. 21 Consequently, the bonus change under-reflects the decline in performance. Second, there are another 1,208
instances where a bonus is paid when the prior period bonus payment is zero (ZB observations).
Here, there is the opposite problem. Since a zero bonus reflects a performance deficit, this deficit must be overcome before a bonus starts to be paid. Consequently, the bonus change again underreflects the, in this case positive, performance change. Table 5 reports estimations of models (2) and (3) of their performance implications differing from those of firms that do not pay a bonus in either period (the implicit baseline group in this specification). Nor, is there any indication of significant differences between BZ and BI2 or between ZB and BC2 (tests not tabulated).
Analyst Forecast and Management Voluntary Disclosure Controls
As a further check on whether other available future performance predictors might possibly account for the predictive impact of bonus reductions on future performance, we consider analyst forecasts and management voluntary disclosure. As analysts are comparatively efficient users of available public information who focus on predicting future firm performance, inclusion of their expectations about future performance improves the ability of the models to predict future performance. Including their forecasts also should capture any publicly (or analyst) available performance related factors that impact compensation (e.g., customer satisfaction) but are not included in the set of control variables used in table 3. We use the last analyst forecast in year t about year t+1 earnings as a proxy for the expected next year performance. We convert the forecasted EPS into forecasted FROE/FROA by multiplying it with the number of outstanding shares then divided by firms' total assets/equity.
It is also likely that qualitative data, particulalry data on non-contractable performance, sheds insights about performance not captured by the more quantitative measures included in the analysis thus far. For example, Ittner and Larcker (1998) and Banker et al. (2000) evaluate the ability of a non-financial performance measure (customer satisfaction) in predicting future performance. They find show that the more satisfied the customers are, the more likely they will return, leading to higher future revenues. More recently, textual analysis measures have been employed to capture the non-numerical information about the firm based on either media reports or firm press releases. For example, Tetlock et al. (2008) construct a more general non-financial information measure -the fraction of negative words in firm-specific news stories, and they
show that their variable is negatively associated with earnings surprise and return (see also Henry and Leone (2009)). Davis et al. (2011) show that the tone of earnings press releases is associated with future operating performance. We use management voluntary disclosure negativity to capture non-performance information. Following Tetlock et al. (2008) , with modifications as suggested in Henry and Leone (2009), our NEG is the ratio of number of negative words to number of total words for all press releases initiated by the firm within fiscal year t and the rank of this variable (RNEG) is used in the analysis. 22 We obtain 247,465 press releases for 12,131 firm years. After merging with the main sample there are 6,391 firm-year observations available for this analysis. 
Other Top Paid Executives
It follows that the future performance implications of bonus reductions should also hold for other top paid executives, as the adverse consequences from reducing pay should hold for 22 We choose to use NEG (the negative words) only for the following reasons. First, both Tetlock (2007) , and Tetlock et al. (2008) have shown that negative words are more powerful than the positive words and including positive words does not affect the results. Second, since we focus on bonus cut, negative words would be more appropriate in our context. them as well. Hence, in table 7 we examine the relation between future performance and whether there is an overall reduction in bonus compensation paid to the other top paid executives covered by ExecuComp. We look at overall pay (excluding CEO pay) because we do not have separate performance measures for each individual executive (or there is only one performance for each firm-year). Accordingly, for this analysis, we require that the set of top paid executives be the same for year t-1 and year t. The sample size drops considerably, to around 6,700
observations, due to this same executive restriction.
The model (1) columns in table 7 report estimations for the full set of available observations. As overall zero changes do not occur in this sample the intercept takes the place of the BI, SI, and EI indicator variables in this model. Consistent with the evidence presented in prior tables, for both ∆ROE and ∆ROA an overall reduction in bonus pay to highly paid non-CEO executives is associated with a decline in future performance (significant at the .10 level)
beyond what can be explained by the magnitude of the overall reduction in pay. When analyst forecasts are incorporated into the estimation (model 2) the relation strengthens. And, after RNEG is included, the relations between overall BC and ∆ROE and ∆ROA are significant at the .05 and .01 levels respectively.
CONCLUSION
While rigidity is an important and pervasive issue in labor economics, it is largely unexplored within the existing literature on executive compensation. Our analysis provides such an exploration, using the wealth of existing theoretical work on rigidity as a guide. We focus on the bonus component of pay as it seems to best fit with the pay for demonstrated performance flavor of much of the existing rigidity theory. Moreover, exploiting data on subsequent firm performance and the relation between cash compensation and future performance (as documented by Hayes and Schaefer, 2000) enables us to empirically evaluate the relevance of differing pay rigidity theories in the executive compensation context. Our key finding here is robust support for adverse "morale" consequences to cutting bonus pay. Specifically, firm performance measured by either ROA or ROE declines following a cut in bonus pay. This decline occurs after controlling for the performance implications of the magnitude of change in pay. To our knowledge, this is the first non-survey based evidence in support of the various "morale" theories of downward pay rigidity.
The analysis also demonstrates the clear presence of downward rigidity in bonus compensation. While there is certainly some existent descriptive evidence indicative of nominal rigidity in the form of inordinate numbers of zero change in pay (or pay component) observations, our analysis directly evaluates the degree to which this rigidity, as it exists within the bonus component of pay, is downward, versus whether it simply reflects contract-driven stickiness in changing pay up or down in a timely manner. Evidence of such downward rigidity contributes to the existing literature on rigidity where there is some uncertainty, particularly with respect to salaried workers (e.g., Kahn, 1997) , whether it is truly present.
The presence of downward rigidity effects in bonus pay and morale consequences to reducing bonus pay also provides further insights into the factors influencing compensation committee decisions regarding such pay. Specifically, existing research focuses extensively on the role of compensation as a purely pecuniary tool. Compensation incentivizes managers to make value-maximizing decisions and provide value-enhancing effort on behalf of shareholders or it is a device by which managers use their power to extract wealth or leisure from the firm.
Consequently, unexplained compensation is interpreted as providing incentives or as exercises of managerial power. Our analysis suggests that unexplained compensation choices, at least with respect to reductions in compensation, may also reflect non-pecuniary motivational underpinnings. That is, concepts such as "fairness," "morale," and "self-actualization" have a role to play in understanding executive compensation practices.
Finally, our analysis provides substantive new insights regarding the Hayes and
Schaeffer (2000) finding that unexplained changes in cash compensation predict future performance. In our analyses, this predictive effect is largely attributable to downward bonus rigidity. Specifically, once indicator variables for bonus increases and decreases are introduced into their model, neither change in cash compensation or change in bonus compensation is significant in explaining future performance. That is, downward rigidity in bonus compensation seems to be the fundamental driver of the future performance effects they document. Return on gross assets at year t, truncated at ±0.2.
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Decile rank of NEG t . Firms are ranked into deciles each year based on negative words in press releases. We then divide the decile numbers by 10.
LEV t
Corporate financial leverage, calculated as the ratio of book value of long-term debt to book value of assets, at the end of year t.
BM t
The book-to-market ratio, calculated as the ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity, at the end of year t. σROE t (σROA t )
The standard deviation of firm i's ROE (ROA) through the period from year t-5 to year t-1.
CAPX t
Capital expenditure during year t, scaled by total assets at the beginning of year t.
RSIZE t
Decile rank of market value of equity at year t. Firms are ranked into deciles each year based on market value of equity. We then divide the decile numbers by 10.
RRDX t
Decile rank of R&D expenditure to sales revenue at year t. Firms are ranked into deciles each year, and the decile numbers are then divided by 10. If R&D expenditure is missing, this value is set to 0.
RSIZE t *RRDX t
Product of RSIZE and RRDX. Log(Tenure) t Natural log of number of years the CEO has been in place. (-16 .21) (-16.16 ) (-16 .30) (-16.27 ) (-10 .97) (-10 .98) (-10 .97) (-10 (-9 .89) (-9 .88) (-9 .89) (-9 .89) (-7 .82) (-7 .87) (-7 .63) (-7 (-7.22 ) (-7 .25) (-7 .24) (-8.68 ) (-6 .26) (-6.26 
